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IPO Lockup Expiration in the Middle East and North Africa Region
Tatiana Hakim
This study examines stock price reaction to IPO lockup expiration in the Middle
East and North Africa (MENA). A lockup is the period of time following an IPO during
which founders and insiders are not allowed to sell their shares. Lockups in the MENA
region are generally longer and more varied than those in the United States, providing an
opportunity to study the relationship between their duration and market reaction. I test
whether, as in the United States, there is an abnormal increase in trading volume and
negative abnormal return around the unlock date, and find that contrary to the United
States there is no noticeable reaction. I provide evidence that the difference in market re-
actions of U.S. and MENA companies is partly attributable to the laws in the MENA re-
gion, which dampens or more strongly restricts selling by insiders during the IPO period.
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There is growing international interest in the Middle Eastern and North African
(MENA) financial markets. The reputation of the region's markets is improving and at-
tracting investors from around the world, thanks to recent alliances with international
bourses, an increasing number of listed companies, reduced foreign ownership restric-
tions, and improved corporate governance practices ("Foreigners Flock to Mideast Mar-
kets," 2008). Up until 2008, the MENA region was the strongest initial public offering
market in the world. It raised approximately US$13.2 billion through 53 IPOs in 10 dif-
ferent countries. The shares offered were oversubscribed at an average of 14.9 times, rais-
ing an average amount ofUS$148.1 billion (Global Investment House, 2009).
An important component of initial public offerings is the lockup: the period dur-
ing which founders and owners are not allowed to sell their shares. The lockup begins on
the first day that the IPO trades and lasts an average of six months. It is a post-IPO tool to
control insiders from exploiting outside investors, helping to ensure that their interests are
aligned (Kryzanowski and Liang, 2008).
Although lockups in the United States are voluntary and their duration mutually
agreed upon by issuers and their underwriters, they are expected by potential investors
(often very influential) who are willing to buy into the IPO. In most MENA countries
lockups are required by law for periods ranging from six months to five years.
This study analyzes market reaction at lockup expiration in the MENA region
with a comparison of its similarities and differences with that observed in the United
States. Family ownership is common and venture backing rare in the MENA region,
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whereas venture capitalist is a mainstay of firms in the United States. A distinction is
therefore made between family firms and non-family firms to determine whether they
respond differently and influence the overall market reaction.
Research on IPOs in the United States finds depressed returns and increased trad-
ing volume upon lockup expiration, and this has been interpreted as the reaction of inves-
tors anxious that insiders may sell off their holdings (Field and Hanka, 2001). I find that
MENA lockups expire without such a reaction and that, also unlike the United States,
IPO underpricing is positively related to lockup duration (cf. Mohan and Chen, 2001;
Brav and Gompers, 2003).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on IPO under-
pricing, share lockups, venture capitalists, family firms, and describes the MENA region
countries covered in the study and their respective lockup laws. Sections 3 discusses the
data collection. Section 4 explores the different hypotheses tested and the methods used




An initial public offering refers to the first time that a firm's stock is offered to the
public. The IPO is the firm's official transition from private to public status. In this proc-
ess, firms create new shares, or founders offer to sell a certain percentage of their own
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shares. These stocks are first sold on the primary market, and then on the listing date, on
the secondary market.
Reasons for going public vary. The most obvious ones are to raise new capital, or
to increase liquidity which will allow owners to convert easily their wealth into cash.
Black and Gilson (1998) suggest that through the IPO, founders and owners regain con-
trol from venture capitalists who exit (as cited by Ritter and Welch, 2002, p.1798). On the
other hand, Zingales (1995) argues that the IPO helps owners with selling prospects
maximize their gains by creating a bargaining advantage through changes in the owner-
ship structure. Specifically, a target company that is publicly traded has many sharehold-
ers other than the founders which will make it harder to potential acquirers to impose
price concessions (as cited by Ritter and Welch, 2002, p.1798).
IPOs are underpriced. Between 1960 and 1969, shares sold in IPOs on the U.S.
Stock exchanges witnessed an initial performance of 1 1 .4 percent (Ibbotson, 1 975). In the
1980s, Ritter (1984) found a first day mean return of 48.4 percent. These initial returns
appear to change across time and industry. During the internet bubble, 1999-2000, mean
return at the end of the first day of trading was 65 percent; it then dropped to 12 percent
in 2001-2003 (Loughran and Ritter, 2004). Underpricing has been observed in Malaysia,
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Canada, among others, where the average re-
turn ranges from less than 10 percent to a high of 80 percent (Loughran, Ritter and
Rydqvist, 1994).
There are a number of possible motives for underpricing an IPO. The quality of
the firm at the IPO is reflected by the degree of underpricing. Welch (1989) suggests that
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high quality firms undervalue their issued shares at IPO to eventually issue seasoned eq-
uity offerings (SEO) at a more reasonable price (as cited by Ritter and Welch, 2002,
p. 1803). Underpriced shares are typically oversubscribed1 therefore their allocation is de-
cided by issuers. Brennan and Franks (1997) explain PO underpricing as a way to re-
duces monitoring because issuers will discriminate large applicants in favor of small
ones. They also find a negative relation between the degree of underpricing and the size
of large blocks after the IPO thus a negative relation between the degree of underpricing
and monitoring (Brennan and Franks, 1997). In contrast, Stoughton and Zechner (1998)
believe that IPO underpricing will attract large investors because during the negotiation
process, issuers will not be the ones with the upper-hand thus giving better treatment to
potential blockholders. Accordingly, the presence of large investors will lead to more
monitoring. Lastly, underpricing the IPO could be seen as a substitute for marketing ex-
penditures. Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) found that one dollar invested in promoting the
firm increases the offer price by one dollar. Furthermore, as conjectured by Loughran and
Ritter (1999), the money left on the table is not as important as direct costs (cited by
Habib and Ljungqvist, 2001, p.455). This means that issuer would prefer to underprice
the IPO rather than having to pay for the firm's promotion.
2.2 Lockups
Once a firm is publicly listed, owners and founders can sell their shares more eas-
ily, and at a strategic time — the first trading day. This is why share lockup agreement
' An issue is considered to be oversubscribed when the demand for a stock before its official listing exceeds the number
of shares issued or supplied. This situation occurs when the issue is underpriced or in great demand due to favorable
growth prospects (www.zawya.com).
4
features in most IPOs, preventing, as Bartlett(1995) argues, founders and owners from
trading in their shares and avoiding an increase in supply that might depress the firm's
value (as cited Brav and Gompers, 2003, p.3). The agreement prohibits insiders2 from
selling any of their shares for a specific period starting on the listing date (Field and
Hanka, 2001). The lockup is a device that signals to the public a common interest be-
tween insiders and new shareholders (Ofek and Richardson, 2000). It is therefore a "form
of commitment overcoming moral hazard problems after the IPO" (Brav and Gompers,
2003, p. 26).
In the United States, the duration of lockups is not prescribed by law or regula-
tions of the Securities and Exchange Commission or state securities regulators. Instead,
the issuing firm and the underwriter decide the lockup period and include it in the under-
writer's agreement3. The underwriter can at any time, and without notice, release the
shares that are locked under the agreement. The typical lockup is 180 days. However, 90-,
270-, and 365-day period can also be observed in the United States (Field and Hanka,
2001). The length of the lockup is negatively related to the firm's transparency as meas-
ured by size, industry classification, and third-party certification such as investment pres-
tige (Brau, Lambson, and McQueen, 2005).
2 Insiders include founding members, owners, directors, and officers.
3 According to Bartlett (1995), the underwriter agreement consists of a covenant such as: "The Selling Security holders
agree that, without your (the investment bank's) prior written consent, the Selling Security holders will not, directly or
indirectly, sell, offer, contract to sell, make any short sale, pledge or otherwise dispose of any shares of Common Stock
or any securities convertible into or exercisable for or any rights to purchase or acquire Common Stock for a period of
180 days following the commencement of the public offering of the Stock by the Underwriters" (as cited in Brav &
Gompers, 2003, p3).
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Even though lockup duration appears in the prospectus, investors may still be ap-
prehensive as expiration nears, fearing a sell-off by insiders. Field and Hanka (2001) re-
port a 40 percent increase in trading volume and a three-day abnormal return of -1 .5 per-
cent around the unlock date. Similar results were found for Canadian high-tech firms,
with significant negative cumulative abnormal returns and abnormal trading volume
around IPO escrow4 expirations (Kryzanowski and Liang, 2008).
2.3 Venture Capitalists
Venture-backed firms experience a market reaction around the unlock date that is
three times stronger than that of non-venture-backed firms (Field and Hanka, 2001). Ac-
cording to Jeng and Wells (1998), venture capitals are successful at backing companies.
However, venture backing is relatively new to the MENA region. The Gulf Venture Capi-
tal Association was founded in the first quarter of 2004 to enlighten the investment com-
munity on the venture capital and private equity industry and to promote its growth in the
Arabian Gulf.5 The 2006 report on Private Equity and Venture Capital in the MENA re-
gion describes changes in companies' performance when they receive equity or venture
capital funds, which support Jeng and Wells' views on the matter (KPMG, 2006). How-
ever, according to Ahmad Al-Sari (Conference Chairman of Gulf Venture Capital) in an
interview with Paul McNamara, the venture capital industry is not well developed in the
MENA region because of the regulatory environment, the legal environment, the lack of
data, and the lack of government policies to encourage development (McNamara, 2005).
4 Escrow agreements are similar to lockup agreements in which certain shares cannot be traded or transferred for a
specified time; however, these shares are usually held by a third party in trust.
5 See http://www.gulfvca.org/
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This thesis does not examine venture capitals in connection with lockups in the MENA
region due to lack of data.
2.4 Family Firms and Ownership
A family firm is defined by Villalonga and Amit (2006) as a firm where the foun-
der or a family member is an officer, a director, or the owner of at least five percent of the
firm's equity, individually or as a group. In the MENA region, family firms represent 90
percent of the businesses, with the next generation taking control within the next five to
ten years (Remo-Listana, 2008 and Al Kady, 2008). Those family firms are now worth
more than US $1 trillion. The structure of family firms in the Gulf Cooperation Council is
such that executive positions are held by family members with full ownership. The condi-
tions imposed on those undergoing an IPO, such as giving up unlimited control and being
subjected to more rigorous accountability standards imposed by the different Capital
Market Authorities, are not very attractive and are reasons for the reluctance of family
firms to go public (Remo-Listana, 2008).
But those that do may benefit from diversifying their financing sources, bringing
in new shareholders or improving the company's image (Marchisio and Ravasi, 2001).
Future Pipes Industries Group's owners, the Makhzoumi family, who have industries in
the MENA region, revealed in an interview that their objectives in going public were to
derive more growth and raise their profile (Remo-Listana, 2008). 6
6 Future Pipes Industries Group canceled their IPO on May 1st, 2008 due adverse market conditions (Press Release,
2008).
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To maintain control, families in the MENA region establish a mother or holding
company, whereas in the western countries a trust might be established. A holding com-
pany does not have the same control tools as a trust (Saddi et al., 2009) (see Table 1). A
holding company owns a majority ofvoting stock in a firm to control its management and
its operations and to elect its Board of Directors. A trust holds shares transferred by the
shareholder to benefit the members of the family where the purpose is to relocate the as-
sets to the trust so that they are not owned by one person but by the whole family, thus
keeping control over the assets in question.







Shareholders' shares from differ- Acquisition of a majority of
ent companies transferred to the shares of subsidiary companies,
trust to be held by the trustees on
their behalf.
Board of trustees manages the Shareholders of holding corn-
trust and nominates the directors pany elect the board of directors
of the constituents. who manages the holding.
Constituent units are dependent. Subsidiaries are independent.
Trust agreement are not easily Easily closed by the sale of share
closed and are for long periods. of the subsidiary company in the
open market.
Profits shared by all constituent Profits are not shared with the
units. subsidiary company but with the
shareholders of the holding com-
pany.
Source: http://www.freemba.in/articlesread.php?artcode=206&substcode=13&stcode=8
25 MENA Countries and Their Stock Exchanges
The MENA region includes the Persian plateau, Mesopotamia, the Arabian Penin-
sula, the Levant, the Mediterranean Sea, and North Africa (Figure 1). According to the
World Bank, it extends over Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan,
Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia,
United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza and Yemen. It's area is almost nine million
square kilometers. The population in 2008 was 324.79 million, and grew at an average
annual rate of 1 .9 percent. The gross domestic product in 2008 amounted to US $1 ,1 17.20
billion, up 5.8 percent from the previous year (World Bank).
The region's economic growth of the past quarter century can be attributed to the
increase in the price of oil and the legacy of economic policies and structures. The
economies of the MENA region countries are diverse, ranging from the oil-rich Gulf
countries such as Saudi Arabia to the resource-scarce countries such as Yemen. This re-
gion was affected by the financial crisis of 2008 even though financial institutions' in-
vestments in sub-prime mortgage-backed securities were smaller than most. The region
also witnessed declines in the regional market indices, weaker foreign direct investment
inflows, and wider spreads on sovereign debt (World Bank).
9
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Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/rnaps/middle_east_and_asia/n_africa_mid_east_poI_95.jpg
The markets covered in this thesis are the most prominent in the region: Casa-
blanca SE in Morocco, Tunis SE in Tunisia, Egypt SE in Egypt, Amman SE in Jordan,
Saudi SE in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain SE in Bahrain, Doha SE in Qatar, Dubai FM and Abu
Dhabi SE in the United Arab Emirates and Muscat SE in Oman. Much of the material
reported in the following subsections is institutional and descriptive and hence draws
heavily on the original sources.7
2.5.1 Morocco
The stock exchange, Casablanca SE, established in 1929, was subject to three re-
forms: a legal entity change in 1948, a legal and technical reorganization in 1967, and
finally a legislative reform in 1993 (Abdel Shahid & El Serafie, 2002). The reason behind
these reforms was to modernize the market. In 1993, companies listed on the Casablanca
7 Kuwait SE in Kuwait is not a market that was covered because the Kuwaiti companies were removed from the sam-
ple, following the criteria described in the Data collection section (section 3.1 ). Nasdaq Dubai in the UA£ is not a
market studied because trading does not take place on a daily basis. The decision to remove the companies traded on
Nasdaq Dubai is discussed in section 3.1 .
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Stock Exchange became more transparent as they were obliged to publish accounting and
financial statements.8
The lockup periods for Casablanca SE are derived from the listing rules. Compa-
nies can be listed on the stock market in three different compartments or three different
equity markets based on the conditions they meet. Each compartment's preset conditions
include a fully paid-up capital, a specified minimum value for the shares outstanding, a
specified minimum number of shares to be offered at IPO, and a specified minimum eq-
uity value that should match one of the preset conditions (Table 2). A company undertak-
ing an IPO will be registered in one of the three compartments. For example, if company
X wishes to go public, and becomes listed in compartment 1, it should have a fully paid
capital, equity of at least 50 million dirhams (about US $6.164 million), issue at least
250,000 shares, and the shares outstanding should have a value of at least 75 million dir-
hams (about US $9.245 million) after IPO. Firms listed in compartments 1 and 2 are not
subject to lockup. However, founders of firms in the third compartment are not allowed
to trade in their shares for three years. These conditions can only be modified by an order
from the Finance Minister through a notice from the board of ethics of securities pro-
posed by the company manager (Article 14, "loi 1-93-211 relative à la bourse des va-
leurs"). Some companies registered in the first or second compartments have a lockup of
six months to one year. It is assumed that these firms were granted exceptions for their
listings in compartment 1 and 2 as they perhaps did not entirely meet the listing require-
s See http://www.casablanca-bourse.com/homeen.html
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ments. As such, the Finance Minister who grants these exceptions imposed a shorter
lockup period relative to the compartment they are listed in.9
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Shares outstanding 75 million Dirhams
= US$ 9.245 million *
25 million Dirhams
- US$ 3.082 million *
10 million Dirhams
; US$ 1 233 million *
Minimum number of
shares issued
250,000 * 100,000 * 30,000*
Liquidity provision
contract
Optional 1 year 3 years
The major conditions that a company should meet to be listed in any of the three compartments are ex-
plained above. A compartment is a market category also referred to as equity market. The Main Market is
compartment 1, the Development Market is compartment 2 and the Growth Market is compartment 3.
These amounts can be modified by the Finance Minister. Source: Bourse de Casablanca.
9 The statement concerning the lockup period in the first and second compartment is an assumption. The Stock Ex-
change in Casablanca was questioned about this matter but there was no response to date.
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252 Tunisia
The Tunis Stock Exchange was established as a public institution in 1969. In the
mid 1990s, the Tunisian equity market was restructured. It underwent a series of reforms,
such as the reform on the regulation and organization of the stock market, that triggered
growth and development. The Financial and Stock Market Law 1994 reorganized and
modernized financial institutions by setting up three bodies: the Stock Exchange, the
Capital Markets Boards and a Central Depository, and STICODEVAM, the securities
clearing and settlement bank.10 The Stock Exchange consequently restructured into a lim-
ited company and its council was given jurisdiction over disclosure requirements, the
guarantee of the stock exchange information and control over the transparency of the of-
fers (AdIy Bellagha, 2006).
The Tunis Stock Exchange has an "official" list and an "unofficial" list. The "offi-
cial" list of the stock exchange is composed of firms that meet listing requirements im-
posed by the regulations of the exchange (Table 3). The "unofficial" list is called the par-
allel market which is reserved for the securities of firms not admitted to the official list.
The official list of the stock exchanges is in turn divided into three markets: the
Principal Market, the Alternative Market and the Bond Market. The first two are crucial
to this study. There are common and distinct conditions for each (Table 3). Large and
high-performance companies enter the Main Market whereas the Alternative Market is
reserved for small and medium companies with good prospects.
18 STICODEVAM is the Tunisian Central Depository and the securities clearing and settlement's central bank. (See
http://www.sticodevam .com).
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Unlike the Casablanca Stock Exchange, listing requirements in Tunisia do not in-
clude a lockup, and it is not a stock exchange regulation. The "Conseil du Marché Finan-
cier," which regulates the Tunis Stock Exchange, recommends a lockup of two years11
that would ensure the new investors of the owner's good intentions. In Tunisia, most of
the owners of firms undertake not to sell more than five percent of the shares they own
for two years. The lockup appears in the IPO prospectuses.
1 This information was provided by the Department Chief of Financia] Information at the CMF.
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Table 3. Listing Requirements in Tunisia
Main Market Alternative Market
Certified financial statements for two financial years before the application for admission*
Offer of at least 10 percent of the capital in the offering
Presentation of a valuation report of its assets
Presentation the manual of procedures of organization, and the structure of internal audit
Presentation of forecast information for 5 years
Common
Conditions
Obtain the agreement of the Financial Market Council
Specific
Conditions
Profit in the two last financial years
Shares of the firm owned by at least 200
shareholders by the day of introduction
A minimum capital of 3 Million Dinars on
the day of the introduction (~ US$ 2.208
Million)
No profit condition required
Shares of the firm owned by at least 100
shareholders or 5 institutional sharehold-
ers by the day of introduction.
The condition of minimum capital is not
required
Admission can be requested: if a com-
pany has its capital held, for more than a
year, at the level of 20 percent at least, by
two institutional investors, at least and if a
company is under establishment by public
offering after the approval of the IPO
prospectus by the Financial Market
Council (announcement in this case is
made by the Financial Market Council
after examination of the file).
A listing sponsor should be appointed for
at least 2 years during all the period in
which its securities are listed on the Al-
ternative Market.
The major conditions that a company should meet to be listed in the main and the alternative market. *




The Egyptian Exchange previously called the Cairo and Alexandria Stock Ex-
change, includes two exchanges: Cairo Stock Exchange and Alexandria Stock Exchange.
The two markets were merged in the late 1940s.
Alexandria Stock Exchange, created in 1885, is the earliest form of a futures mar-
ket. Different types ofcotton were traded in coffee houses. The popularity of these trades
grew, and consequently, the "Association Cotonnière d'Alexandrie" was established in a
building near the area where the trades were formerly made. Cairo Stock Exchange also
started its operations informally; however, its growth required it to follow the footsteps of
Alexandria Stock Exchange. In 1903, Cairo Stock Exchange was created with 97 listed
companies.
The lockup as stated in the Commercial Law of Egypt is two financial years from
the date of establishment of the company. In other words, founders cannot trade the
shares they subscribed for before the publication of two balance sheets and two profit and
loss statements of two consecutive financial years (with each year not to be less than 12
months) following the company's establishment date.12 However, as an exception, the
transfer of ownership of the shares subscribed for by the founders can take place between
founders, from a founder to a Board of Directors' member should they be needed to be
submitted to the Board as a guarantee for his seat, or from the founder's heirs to third par-
ties, in case of death (Article 45 of Law 159 issued in 1981).
12 The prospectuses of the Egyptian companies in the sample suggest a six-month lockup period. Contact was made
with Egypt SE and the Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority (EFSA), but no response was forthcoming.
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2.5.4 Jordan
In the early 1930s, three major companies, the Arab Bank, the Company of To-
bacco and Cigarettes, and the Electricity Company were established as public sharehold-
ing companies. At the beginning, there was no official stock exchange to trade their
shares. In 1976, with the ongoing increase in the number of public shareholding compa-
nies, the Amman Financial Market was officially established. January 1, 1978, marked
the date of the first official trading day with 66 listed companies. In 1997, to meet inter-
national standards for arms-length dealing, the Securities Law split the exchange into
three bodies: the Jordan Securities Commission, the Amman Stock Exchange, and the
Security Depository Center.13
The Company Law of 1997 drafted by the Jordanian Ministry of Industry and
Trade states in Article 100 that there is a period of two years from the date of establish-
ment of any listed company during which the founding members may not dispose of their
shares (See Table 5 in Section 2.4.10). The founders can only transfer shares to their
heirs, between spouses, and among the founders themselves. Selling shares to third par-
ties can only occur as per judicial decision.
13 Jordan Securities Commission "'develops, regulates and monitors Jordan's capital market to maintain a sound invest-
ment environment and protect investors'" (See http://www.isc.gov.jo) . Amman Stock Exchange is the Jordanian stock
market where public shareholding companies have their shares traded in (See http://www.ase.com .io) . The Security
Depositary Center (SDC) registers, issues, safe-keeps, deposits, clears and settles securities, transfers ownership of
securities, performs ownership restrictions and reports and maintain corporate actions performed by issuers (e.g. Stock
split, merger...) at the SDC in an electronic format (See http://www.sdc .com .io/).
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2.5.5 Saudi Arabia
In the mid 1930s, the Arabian Automobile Company was established as the first
joint stock company. By 1975, there were 14 public companies. The market was made
"official" in the 1980s in an effort to better regulate it. Supervision and the development
was in the hands of a ministerial committee composed of the Ministry ofFinance and Na-
tional Economy, the Ministry of Commerce and the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency.14
The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency was the sole regulator and monitor ofmarket activi-
ties until the creation of the Capital Market Authority in 2003, after which the role passed
hands.
The Saudi Stock Exchange is also referred to as Tadawul which is the Arabic
word for Exchange. Its listing rules allow companies to be listed only if they have been
operational for at least three years. These companies have a minimum lock up of six
months. The selling restriction is imposed by the Capital Market Authority on sharehold-
ers owning a majority of shares. The listing rules can be relaxed. Some companies called
"Greenfield" companies are listed in the market while they are still being established.
They offer their shares to the public at par (SAR 10 - US$ 2.66) before becoming opera-
tional to raise seed capital. Greenfield companies are allowed to be listed on the Ex-
change by Royal Decree and have varying lockup periods. It is usually at least three years
before the company satisfies the original requirement for listing, but it may be as long as
five years. The lockup will vary from one company to another depending on the nature of
14 SAMA established in 1 952, is the central bank of Saudi Arabia. SAMA played a very important role in the develop-
ment of the Saudi Financial System and has the following functions: issuing the national currency, acts as a banker to
the government, supervises commercial banks, manages the kingdom's foreign exchange reserves, conducts monetary
policy to promote price and exchange rate stability, and promotes the growth and ensures the soundness of the financial
system (See http://www.sama.gov.sa )
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the business (Table 4). For example, telecommunication and insurance companies have
three-year lockups whereas real estate companies have five. The lockup period can be
increased or decreased at the Capital Market Authority's discretion.




Real Estate 5 years
Petrochemical & Cement 3 years or when commercial production starts whichever
is later
The lockup period imposed in Saudi Arabia by the CMA to "Greenfield" companies according to the indus-
try they belong to is described above.
2.5.6 Bahrain
Before the mid 1 980s, public shareholding companies in Bahrain were traded ac-
tively in a unofficial market called "al Jowhara Market" which can be translated as "the
Jewel Market." A decree issued in 1987 established the Bahrain Stock Exchange, which
started operating in 1989.
The Commercial Companies Law of Bahrain mentions a two-year lockup from
the date of the final incorporation of the company for holders of in-kind15 shares (Article
123), and one financial year on the shares' for which founders have subscribed, also start-
ing from the date of incorporation (Article 124). The one-year restriction period can be
longer. If so, the length is specified in the company's articles of association.
Preferred stock that pay interest or dividends through additional bonds or preferred stock.
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In case of death or bankruptcy, the in-kind shareholders' heirs or the bankruptcy
trustee are allowed to sell the in-kind shares during the restriction period. The shares sub-
scribed to by the founders may be transferred during the ban by selling them from one
founder to another or from the heirs of one founder to a third party or from the bank-
ruptcy trustee of the bankrupt founder to a third party (Ministry of Industry and Com-
merce, Bahrain, 2001).
2.5.7 Qatar
The Doha Securities Market started its activities in May, 1997 with 17 listed com-
panies, traded manually but eventually becoming fully electronic. Amendments in the
laws and regulations were carried out to build up the exchange's reputation among the
other markets in the region. It was recently converted into a shareholding company called
Qatar Exchange and is currently in partnership with NYSE Euronext (Qatar Exchange,
2010).
The Commercial Companies Law (Law No. 5 of 2002) states that founders are not
allowed to dispose of their shares for two years from the date of incorporation of the
company. In case of death of any founder, the heirs are not allowed to sell shares inher-
ited during the lockup period.
20
2.5.8 United Arab Emirates
The United Arab Emirates has three financial markets: Abu Dhabi Stock Ex-
change, Dubai Financial Market and Nasdaq Dubai. This thesis covers only Abu Dhabi,
established November, 2000, and Dubai, established March of the same year.16
The Companies Law drafted by the United Arab Emirates Ministry of Economy
states in Article 173 that shares exchanged for cash and shares in-kind that are subscribed
to by the founders cannot be transferred or exchanged prior to the publication of a bal-
ance sheet and profit and loss statements of two consecutive financial years from the date
of its constitution. During the lockup, the transfer or sale of any shares for cash and
owned by a founder can take place between founders, or another board member to be pre-
sented as guarantee for his seat on the board or by the heirs of a deceased founder to third
parties (Ministry of Economy, no date available).
2.5.9 Oman
The Muscat Securities Market was established in June 1988 to regulate and con-
trol the Omani Securities Market. Following ten years of continuous growth, two royal
decrees were issued to promote better functioning of the market by establishing a capital
market authority.
According to the Commercial Law of Muscat (Article 77), founders cannot dis-
pose of their shares nor withdraw from the company until the company has published two
financial statements for two consecutive years as from the starting date of effective pro-
16Trading does not take place daily on Nasdaq Dubai.
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auction or the starting date of its activities.17 The lockup period can be extended for one
additional year by a decision taken by the Minister of Commerce and Industry and at the
request of the capital market authority (Minister of Commerce and Industry, 1974). Pri-
vate companies that have been established prior to the introduction of their shares on the
stock exchange with a good operational record could have their lockup period relaxed to
six months instead of the mandatory two years. The two-year lockup is applicable to
newly established companies that have not yet started their operations.18
2.5.10 Summary
This overview of securities laws pertaining to lockups in the different MENA
markets shows that the MENA region differs from the United States in that lockups are
generally mandatory (e.g., true in Amman but recommended by the capital market
authority in Tunis). The average lockup in most of these countries is two years, which is
longer than the average lockup in the United States and more varied. There are few ex-
ceptions where the lockup is limited to six months for special cases in Saudi Arabia and
Morocco (Table 5). The longest is five years imposed on Saudi real estate companies that
are newly established (Table 5). Tunis SE is the only stock exchange in the region with a
voluntary lockup.
17 Exempted from this condition are (1) shares that are owned by the government, (2) transfer of shares between the
founders, and (3) in case of inheritance.
18This additional information that explains the 6-month lockup period is provided by a MSM contact.
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Table 5. Summary of the Lockup Durations in the MENA region
Market Lockup Duration Voluntary/Mandatory
Abu Dhabi SE 2 financial years starting from the date of establishment
Amman SE 2 years starting from the date of establishment





1 year from date of incorporation after the publication of the
Balance Sheet, and the Profit and Loss Account of the finan-
cial year (This period could be longer as stipulated in the
company's Article ofAssociation)
Cairo SE 2 years starting from the date of listing
Casablanca SE 3 years from listing date for companies matching the third
compartment's requirements. No lockup period required for
the firms in the other 2 compartments. But could be imposed
for 6 months to 1 year for compartments 1 and 2
Doha SM 2 years from the date of incorporation
Dubai FM 2 financial years starting from the date of establishment
Muscat SM 2 years for newly established firms, 6 months for firms with
good records and of long standing status
Saudi SE 6 months for companies operational for a 3-year period be-
fore the IPO; 3 years starting from the listing date for insur-
ance and telecommunication firms; 5 years for real estate
firms; 3 years or when commercial activities start whichever











Company information, mainly scanned prospectuses, was collected, and in many
instances translated from Arabic, from the Zawya database and Bloomberg. Zawya is a
commercial curator and supplier of financial information in the middle east
(http://www.zawya.com). Daily close-to-close stock prices, volume and market index
levels were obtained from Bloomberg and from Zawya.
All companies making initial public offerings between January 1, 1999 and De-
cember 26, 2008 were identified. This resulted in a raw sample of 256 firms classified as
listed, not listed, cancelled or closed, and of which 220 listed firms were kept.19 From
those, 12 were excluded because of missing information or because the firm was traded
over-the-counter. The remaining 208 were then screened for specific information in the
prospectuses.
Companies in the MENA region are not entirely transparent, and the information
in prospectuses is sometimes inconsistent. The unlock dates are not always published
publicly or at least not recorded. The Zawya database supplies the prospectuses of the
IPOs for the region in which the lockup period and the starting date of the lockup is
specified. For the early IPOs (1999 until 2003), prospectuses were not available as the
markets were then new and companies were either opaque or not bound by strict laws.
19 "Not listed" refers to companies undergoing IPOs without being listed on a specific stock exchange. This happens
when there is no stock exchange in the country. The status of these companies will change to "listed" once they list on
their respective stock exchanges. "Not listed" also refers to companies that were listed and then delisted later. "Can-
celled" refers to companies that released a prospectus but never went through with the IPO or companies that launched
an IPO and then, for various reasons, decided to cancel if by returning the money to the subscribers. "Listed" refers to
companies that completed the IPO and were successfully listed on a specific stock exchange. "Closed" is a status given
to companies that completed their IPO and are waiting to be listed.
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About 196 prospectuses are available in the Zawya database, with lockup information
available for 142. Some prospectuses did not report lockup duration, while for others the
information was ambiguous.
The unlock date was calculated from the reported start date of the lockup and the
lockup period. A lockup period expressed in months or years was converted to days and
added to the starting date of the lockup.
Unlock Date = Start Date + Lockup Period(days) ( 1 )
Some companies provided two possible starting dates for the lockup or two possible un-
lock dates.20 The date chosen for most was the later one, but unfortunately, many were
impossible to ascertain. These uncertainties resulted in more culling and brought the
sample down to 119. Another 51 companies were excluded because their unlock dates
were after April, 2009, and therefore, at the time of data collection, there wasn't enough
price data available following the unlock date. Companies on Nasdaq Dubai were ex-
cluded because they appeared to have low liquidity and a market index was unavailable
to compute risk-adjusted returns (Fattah & Anwar, 2009). Based on all of these exclu-
sions, the final sample was whittled down to 63 companies traded on the following stock
exchanges: Abu Dhabi SE, Casablanca SE, Bahrain SE, Amman SE, Cairo SE, Doha SM,
Dubai FM, Muscat SM, Saudi SE, Tunis SE.
20 The two possible starting dates are the listing date or the date of establishment published in the newspaper. The two




Family firms represent 90 percent of all the businesses in the MENA region
(Remo-Listana, 2008). I assume that family firms are reluctant to give up a big part of
their shares because they want to retain control (Remo-Listana, 2008). I therefore expect
that family firms will not display the same price reaction or trading activity as non-family
firms upon being unlocked. The IPO prospectuses available in the Zawya database pro-
vide lists of founders and owners. Villalonga and Amit (2006) specify how to determine
whether a firms is a family firm. For this thesis, a firm is deemed to be family-owned if
any of the definitions in Table 6 is satisfied.
Table 6. Definition ¡of a Family Firm
1 One or more family members are officers, directors, or block holders
2 The family is the largest shareholder
3 The family is the largest vote-holder and has at least family officer and one family director
4 One or more family members are directors or block holders, but there are no family officers
The partial list of the different definitions of family firms specified by Villalonga and Amit (2006, p.4 1 3) is
used as a guide to differentiate the types of firms in the sample.
3.3 Summary Statistics
Table 7 reports the sample size, the fraction of family firms, the mean fraction of
shares offered, and lockup duration for each stock exchange for the period 2004 to 2008.
The fraction of family-owned firms is around 31 percent which is relatively low as an-
ticipated in the literature on family firms in the MENA. The mean fraction of post-IPO
shares sold in the offer is about 36 percent, and is close to that reported by Field and
Hanka(2001).
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Saudi SE and Amman SE are the two dominant stock exchanges in the sample
with 17 and 24 of the 63 firms. Table 7 also shows that lockup duration does not vary
much from market to market. Most fall between six months and two years. Even though
Saudi Arabia has strict lockup laws, allowing for up to five years, it has the lowest aver-
age at 278 days. (Many Saudi firms have a lockup of three to five years. Unfortunately,
these firms had to be removed from the sample because their unlock dates fell after July
2009.) Cairo has the shortest with an average of 180 days; however, recall that their law
stipulates that founders are not allowed to sell their shares before the end two fiscal years.
Overall, most of the stock exchanges require an average lockup of two years. The average
for the MENA region as a whole is 559 days, which is considerably longer than the 187
reported by Field and Hanka for the United States.
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Sixty-three IPOs with unlock dates from 2004 to 2008. Mean Fraction ofPost-IPO Shares Locked Up is
assumed to be equal to one minus the percentage number of shares issued.
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4. Hypotheses and Methods
4.1 Hypothesis 1 — Price Reaction on Unlock Day
Previous studies have examined the price and volume reaction to lockup expira-
tion. Field and Hanka (2001) observed a 40 percent increase in the trading volume and a
three-day abnormal return of -1.5 percent on the unlock date. The cumulative three-day
abnormal return is significantly negative around the unlock date. Unlike its western
neighbour, lockups in the MENA region, with few exceptions, are imposed by laws set by
a ministry of finance or a capital market authority. The duration of these trading restric-
tions is stipulated in IPO prospectuses. Will the market reaction in the MENA region be
similar to that in the United States?
Null Hypothesis 1: There is no price reaction to lockup period expiration.
#o : I1CAR - °
Alternative Hypothesis J: There is a price reaction to lockup period expiration.
?,?µ^F?
where µe?? is mean cumulative abnormal return across firms on unlock day. I follow
Field and Hanka (2001, p. 477) and compute cumulative abnormal returns by compound-
ing the simple daily return for firm / deflated by the same-day return on the market index
m of the exchange on which the firm is listed. The three-day cumulative abnormal return
straddling an event day such as an unlock day, for example, is shown in equation (2).
CAR.= ? I + /?,Ì + R. -1 (2)m J J
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CARs capture the influence of extraneous events on stock prices. Price reaction is then
measured by the cross-sectional mean of cumulative abnormal returns for windows strad-
dling the unlock day. A number of different windows are investigated to compensate for
possible measurement error in ascertaining unlock dates. Trading volume is tracked
graphically to determine whether overall market activity tells a consistent story.
4.2 A Note on Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Missing Price Data
The actual unlock day was, as mentioned previously, not always clear. Further-
more, the day recorded sometimes fell on a non-trading day. The various exchanges have
different non-trading days. And finally, all of the companies had periods during which
they did not trade. As the cumulative abnormal returns (and, for that matter, the abnormal
trading volumes) are based on time windows of a given width, some explanation of how
the data in these windows were put together is in order. All computations based on time
windows started with the recorded unlock date. Most of the tests involve windows that
straddle the unlock date. If the unlock day was a non-trading day for the exchange or the
company itself, the next available trading day was taken as the unlock day. The requisite
number of observations straddling this event date were then collected to make the win-
dow. This means, for example, that a ten-day window always had ten observations, al-
though there might be substantial non-trading gaps between them on either side of the
event date. The windows are therefore not necessarily symmetrical about the event date
in calendar days. Two other methods of gathering observations for the windows were also
used to ensure robustness of the results. One kept the unlock date as recorded, even if it
was a non-trading day, and forced the width of the window to equal its specified number
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of calendar days regardless of the number of non-trading days that fell within it. This
means that a ten-day window could have far fewer observations than ten. The reason for
using this method is that investors are deemed to be cognizant of the unlock day and their
perception of the attractiveness of the stock may increase or diminish as the day ap-
proaches or passes regardless of whether trade was physically possible. Another ap-
proach, which is more applicable to windows that do not straddle the unlock date, took
the unlock day as recorded, and expanded the window backwards if the window fell be-
fore the unlock date (for example, day -50 to day -6) and expanded forward if the win-
dow straddled the unlock date to catch the desired number of trading days (with reference
to the Market's trading days as opposed to the company's trading days). In general, all
methods yielded qualitatively similar results, so only the results for the first are dis-
cussed.
4.3 Hypothesis 2 — IPO Underpricing
Like the United States, there is evidence of IPO underpricing in the Gulf Coopera-
tion Council countries represented by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates,
Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain (Amirrad, 2007). As these countries are in the MENA region
and because the unlock day question exists because of IPOs, it is of interest to present
evidence on possible IPO underpricing in the MENA region.
Null Hypothesis 2: MENA IPOs are not underpriced.
?0:µ = 0
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Alternative Hypothesis 2: MENA IPOs are underpriced.
?]:µ>0
whereµ is the mean across companies of first-trading day, market-adjusted abnormal re-
turns in (3).
MAAR1= R11- Rn, ? (3)
The return on stock i is the simple return computed from the closing price on the first
trading day relative to the issue price of the IPO, and the return on the corresponding
market is the same as that used to compute the CARs in (2).
MENA IPOs are oversubscribed, so newly issued shares are distributed to inves-
tors pro-rata, with each receiving an equal fraction (Amirrad, 2007). There is therefore an
opportunity cost to investors for the money tied up, which along with transaction costs,
may influence first trading day returns; AI-Hassan, Delgado and Omran (2007) contend
that because of this the simple return used in (3) over-estimates the actual initial return
(Amirrad, 2007, p.26). However, there is no data available on refunds to investors who
are not allocated the number of shares requested, so (3) is the imperfect proxy used.
4.4 Hypothesis 3 — IPO Underpricing and Lockup Duration
Courteau (1995) argues that high-quality firms signal their quality by agreeing to
longer lockups, whereas insiders of low-quality firms would be unwilling to bear the cost
of committing for a longer time. One motivation to signal quality is to get a higher offer-
ing price at the IPO or to get a better price at the SEO (Brav and Gompers, 2003; Welch,
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1989). The IPO of a firm with a longer lockup will be less underpriced than one with a
shorter lockup, all things being equal. This signaling hypothesis makes sense where
lockup duration is the voluntary decision of the firm, or the firm and its underwriter, as it
is in the United States. But not in the MENA region where lockups are generally set by
law according to criteria that vary from market to market. Here, lockup duration can be
interpreted as an explicit pronouncement of the authorities' belief as to the quality or
transparency of the company. The signal is therefore the opposite ofthat posed by Cour-
teau (1995). A longer lockup signals lower firm quality, necessitating more rather than
less underpricing, if any. This leads to Hypothesis 3.
Null Hypothesis 3: IPO issue day returns do not depend on lockup duration.
**0 ¦ ßlockup<lSO ~ Mhckup>ÌSO
Alternative Hypothesis 3: Companies subject to longer lockups have higher IPO issue
day returns.
"? ¦ ßlockup< 1 80 < A*Zorfaip>180
where fllenglh„fhck„p is the mean MAAR for firms with a given lockup duration.
4.5 Hypothesis 4 — Family Firms and Trading Volume on Unlock Day
In the MENA region, family finfis are relatively young, often with less than 65
years of operation (Sfakianakis, 2009). It is possible that families are not willing to give
up the control of their firms despite the opportunities that an IPO may offer — a new
source of funding, and according to Krips Newman (1985), an improvement in the firm's
borrowing and bargaining power, which in turn reduces borrowing costs. This may be
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why there have been few IPOs for family-owned firms in MENA. In the United Arab
Emirates, for example, families were at one time allowed to retain only 45 percent of the
total shares when going public. This was later increased to 70 percent in order to encour-
age public listing (Rimo-Listana, 2008). I hypothesize that family firms in an IPO will
exhibit less trade activity on unlock day than non-family firms.
Null Hypothesis 4: There is no difference in mean abnormal trading volume of
family and non-family firms on unlock day.
0 * family firms nonfamily firms
Alternative Hypothesis 4: Family firms exhibit less abnormal trading volume on un-
lock day than non-family firms.
H -V =V0 family firms nonfamily firms
where V is the mean 3-day abnormal trading volume (T=3), computed as in (4).
^=-7-% 1 (4)
— y v.45 ^ 'H-> /=-50
Here I again follow Field and Hanka (2001, p. 478). Abnormal trading volume, V , on a
given day is that day's volume as a fraction of mean daily volume for some prior period,
such as the 45 days ending six days before the event day. Volume is a noisy proxy for this
hypothesis. Trades at the bid and ask would be better but are not available. I test whether
mean abnormal volume for three-, seven-, and ten-day windows straddling the unlock day
are significantly different from zero using t-tests.
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4.6 Regression
Pooled ordinary least squares regressions are used to explore the cross-sectional
variation of three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and the natural logarithm of
three-day abnormal trading volume ( log ( 1 + VJ ).
LAR -OC + PFamily Firm* Family Firm + Psize^Size + HFriic^Frac + PRun up* Run up
"*" PSaudi* Saudi ' PAmman* Amman "*" PuKkup Duration* Lockup Duration Pvol*Vol ' ^
VOI — a + PFamily Firm*- Family Firm + PSize* Size + PFrac*Frac + PRun «?* Kim up
"*¦ PSaudi* Saudi ' PAmman*Amman "¦" Plockup Duration *lj>ckup Duration ' PcAR*CAR + £
(5)
(6)
Family Firm is a dummy variable equal to one when the firm is designated a family firm
and zero otherwise. Size is the common logarithm of IPO issue price times the number of
shares outstanding. Frac is the fraction of shares locked up. Run up is the common loga-
rithm of one plus the cumulative return from the IPO until day -6. Saudi is a dummy vari-
able equal to one when the firm is listed on Saudi SE and zero otherwise. Amman is a
dummy variable equal to one when the firm is listed on Amman SE and zero otherwise.
Controlling for the Saudi and Amman exchanges is done because they represent more
than 50 percent of the sample. Lockup Duration is a dummy variable equal to one when
the firm has a long lockup period (more than 180 days) and zero otherwise. The short
lockup duration equals 1 80 days.
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5. Results and Discussion
5.1 Visual Inspection of Time Series
I first present a visual inspection of the time series of returns to depict the varia-
tions from country to country around the unlock day, and to compare the different catego-
ries under study: the types of firms (family and non-family firms) and lockup duration
(180 days and more than 180 days). I argue, as a result of this inspection, that even
though the cumulative abnormal returns at the unlock date are negative (for most of the
subcategories), the association between the expiration date and share price is weaker than
it is in the United States.
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Figure 2 shows the time series ofmean cumulative abnormal returns for the entire
sample of 63 companies according to family and non-family designation and with respect
to their individual unlock dates (t = 0). The cumulative return fluctuates between -4 and 9
percent, and is negative on the unlock day for the overall sample (-0.0108 for the entire
sample) and remains so for the rest of the period under study, until day 50. The dip below
zero, extending over a 20-day period, is much smaller and smoother than that of firms in
the United States as reported by Field and Hanka. There is a difference between family
and non-family firms in the magnitude of cumulative returns or the number of days on
which they are negative. The cumulative returns of family firms are twice as volatile as
that of the sample as a whole. The volatility of the cumulative abnormal returns of family
firms could be caused by the uncertainty about their future actions.
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Sixty-three MENA region IPOs with listing dates from 2004 to 2008. There are 22 family firms and 41
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Half of the sample is made up of Saudi and Jordanian (the Amman exchange)
companies. It is therefore important to confirm whether, in light of different market regu-
lations from country to country, the returns of these two or possibly a small number of
firms within them are driving the time series of the entire sample. Figures 3 and 4 on the
next page show the series for Saudi Arabia and Jordan. The cumulative returns of firms
listed in Saudi Arabia is mostly positive, specially around the unlock day. However, firms
listed in Jordan reveals a smooth dip to minus nine percent around day 14 followed by a
six percent increase in mean cumulative abnormal returns until day 50, and this cannot be
attributed to a single company or small number of companies. The removal of Saudi Ara-
bia and Jordan from the sample would leave mean cumulative abnormal returns negative
at -0.05 and declining; but overall, there is no indication that the Saudi and Jordan
subsamples are driving the observed results.
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30 40 50
39
Figure 5 presents the time series of mean cumulative abnormal returns around the
unlock day for lockups of 1 80 days and those that are longer. The mean cumulative ab-
normal return for firms with a lockup of more than 180 is negative at the unlock date but
that for firms with shorter lockups is positive and decreasing.
Mean Risk-Adjusted Returns By Lockup DurationFigure 5.
£ 0.03
negCAR)80days0.021(T 180 days
NegCARmoreita- 100(J more than 1 80 days 0 .02
Trading Day Relative to Unlock Date
— 180 days — more than 1 80 days
Twenty-six firms with a short lockup (1 80 days) and 37 firms with a long lockup (more than 1 80 days). s
is the standard deviation and NegCAR is the frequency of negative cumulative abnormal returns of each
sample.
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Most of the IPOs in this study took place in 2008 during the sub-prime loan crisis.
Even though banks and financial companies of the region apparently did not hold large
amounts of sub-prime mortgage-backed securities and most countries of the Gulf had
strong financial positions to overcome the outflow of short-term capital, the financial cri-
sis still had an impact on the financial outlook in the region (World Bank, 2009). Figure 6
charts mean cumulative abnormal returns for unlock dates before and after 2008. There
are apparent systematic differences however they don't suggest that the crises affected the
cumulative abnormal returns of the companies in this sample. The cumulative returns of
firms with an unlock date before 2008 is lower than that of firms with an unlock date af-
ter 2008 and is decreasing.
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Sixty-three MENA region IPOs, 29 with unlock dates before 2008 and 34 with unlock dates after.
In the United States, cumulative abnormal returns have stable positive variations
pre-unlock and negative variations post-unlock following the dip that occurs at t=0
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whereas in the MENA, cumulative abnormal returns have smoother decreasing variations
throughout the period under study.
5.2 Cumulative Abnormal Returns
The mean and median cumulative abnormal returns for various windows strad-
dling the unlock day are reported in Table 8. Fifty-six percent of the companies experi-
ence negative three-day CARs with a mean of -0.0049 and a median of -0.0077.21 How-
ever, consistent with the preceding graphical analysis, it cannot be concluded that the
mean is significantly different from zero for any of the event windows. MENA IPOs do
not exhibit the negative price reaction on unlock day that IPOs in the United States do.
When the tests of three-, seven- and ten-day CARs are applied separately to the
subsamples of 180-day lockups and those that are longer, it is found that, like Field and
Hanka, that CARs for the longer lockups are insignificantly negative. However, the ten-
day CAR for firms with short lockups period is significantly negative at the ten percent
level (mean = 0.0313 and a t-value = -1.8202). The three- and seven-day CARs are how-
ever insignificant. The significance of the ten-day CAR shows that the 63 companies in
the sample experienced an event over the ten-day period that might not be related to the
unlock date. The graphical analysis of figure 2 unlike the time series for cumulative ab-
normal returns in Field and Hanka's study (2001), doesn't depict a single drop that would
suggest a single similar event but five dips that could be interpreted as five different
21 The first "other" method described in section 4.2 yields significantly negative seven- and ten-day CARs at a five per-
cent confidence level.
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events. Therefore, these results cannot lead to any conclusion about a specific reaction to
the unlock date.
Table 8. Cumulative Abnormal Return Around the Unlock Day
CAR ? 100
Period Mean Median









Day -5 to +1
Day -5 to +5
Day +2 to 10
Day +11 to +50
Fraction with negative CAR for Days -1 to +1 56.45%
Sample is 63 MENA IPOs with lockup periods of 6 months to 5 years. The CAR for each firm is computed










































Figure 7 shows time series of mean daily abnormal trading volume where it can
be seen that volume increases for non-family but not family firms and spikes a little more
than a month after unlock day. Figure 8 shows the same after the removal of two Jorda-
nian outliers, Tuhama for Financial Investment (a non-family firm) and Housing Loan
Insurance Company (a non-family firm), whose cumulative abnormal trading volumes
were 3.5 times the volume of any other company in the sample. Again, neither family nor
non-family firms display a distinct change in volume close to unlock day, but the volume
of family firms is higher than that of non-family firms throughout most of the pre-unlock
period.
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Volume is measured relative to each firm's mean volume over days -50 to -6 according to equation (4).
sample is 63 MENA IPOs with listing dates 2004 to 2008, 22 family firms and 41 non-family firms.
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Abnormal volume is measured relative to each firm's mean volume over days -50 to -6 according to equa-
tion (4). The sample is 61 MENA IPOs with listing dates 2004 to 2008. Two outliers, Tuhama for Financial
Investment and Housing Loan Insurance Company (non-family firms listed on Amman SE), are removed.
There are 22 family firms and 39 non-family firms.
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Figure 9 breaks down cumulative abnormal volume by lockup duration. The mean
volume of firms with long lockups is higher and more variable, beginning about day 12.
Non-family firms (Figure 8) have long lockup periods as the plots of their respective
mean cumulative abnormal volume follow a similar tendency. Low cumulative abnormal
volume for firms with short lockup periods is not only driven by family firms but by a
mixture of both family and non-family firms.




















-50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50
Trading Day Relative to Unlock Date
— 180 days or less — more 180 days
There are 26 firms with a short lockup period (1 80 days) and 35 firms with a long lockup period (more than
1 80 days or more).
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Figure 10 presents cumulative abnormal volume for unlock dates before and after
2008. There are no striking differences in cumulative trading volume for firms with un-
lock dates before and after 2008 suggesting that the crisis didn't affect the activity of the
stock market.





















-50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50
Trading Day Relative to Unlock Date
— <2008 - >2008 — Median <2008 - Median >2008
Volume is measured relative to each firm's mean volume over days -50 to -6. Sample is 61 MENA IPOs
with listing dates over the period 2004 to 2008. There are 29 firms with unlock dates before 2008 and 32
firms with unlock dates after.
The analysis of the daily volume in all the different categories shows that contrary
to the United States that witnesses a striking 40 percent increase at the unlock date, the
percentage change in the mean abnormal volume in the MENA does not vary much. The
difference between the market reaction in the United States and the MENA could be due
to the type of lockups used. In the MENA, the lockups might not be valued as much as in
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the United States because it is mandatory and a law rather than voluntary and an agree-
ment.
5.4 OLS Regression Results
The regression results are reported in Table 9. Few independent variables affect
significantly the dependent variables. Unlike previous findings, the log (1+ abnormal
volume) is not determined by the run-up, inconsistent with Field and Hanka (2001),
Odean (1998), Shefrin and Statman (1985), and Ferris, Haugen, and Makhija (1988) (as
cited in Field and Hanka, 2001, p. 483). The dummy variable for family firms is not sig-
nificant. It means that there is no additional impact on the cumulative abnormal return
and volume when the company is a family firm. Companies trading in Amman stock ex-
change have a lower abnormal volume than the other firms listed in the other markets;
¦Log(l + V) decreases by around 35.23 percent for the whole sample, 56.58 percent for
family firms and 29.85 percent for non-family firms. Family firms listed in the Saudi
stock exchange have a higher CAR (a CAR increase by 4.23 percent) than the firms listed
in other exchanges. The fraction of shares locked up post-IPO and the CAR of family
firms have a significant positive relation. All in all, no conclusion can be drawn from the
results of the OLS regression. There should be other undetermined factors not accounted
for that would affect the abnormal return and volume.
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Table 9. Pooled OLS Models ofAbnormal Returns and Volume Around the Unlock Day
CAR Log(l + v)




































































































































Ordinary Least Square regression from equation (5) and (6). Sample is 61 lockup expiration days in the
period 2004 to 2008. Abnormal returns and volume are measured over days -1 to +1. Abnormal return is
measured relative to the market specific value-weighted index. Abnormal volume is relative to each firm's
average three-day trading volume in days -50 to -6. Frac is the fraction of post-IPO shares locked up which
is equal to the percentage of shares not offered in the G?0. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, ** significantly
different from zero at the 1 0 percent level and at the 5 percent respectively (two-tailed t test).
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5.5 Initial IPO Returns and Lockup Duration
Table 10 reports descriptive statistics for IPO returns on the first trading day after
issuance. The returns are computed according to equation (3) and with respect to Hy-
pothesis 2. It can be seen that mean abnormal return is significantly positive for the sam-
ple as a whole, and is in turn attributable to 46 companies on five exchanges, Saudi SE,
Doha SE, Abu Dhabi SE, Muscat SM, and Amman SE. The samples for a number of the
exchanges are too small to yield significant statistics despite their seemingly large posi-
tive means. Only two of the exchanges have companies with negative mean returns, and
these represent just four of the 61 companies. Overall, the evidence is consistent with IPO
underpricing.
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Table 10. IPO Returns on First Trading Day
A. Whole sample
Mean Std. Dev. t-value N
1.309 1.984 5.1510** 61
B. By exchange















































Returns are market-adjusted abnormal returns from equation (3). Two-tailed t-tests for significant differ-
ence from zero at the 1 0 percent (*) and 5 percent levels (**).
Table 11 reports the results of tests of Hypothesis 3, which poses that IPO under-
pricing will be greater the longer the lockup because a lockup imposed by the authorities
is a signal of perceived quality and stability of the firm. However, as discussed in Section
2 and, in particular, Table 5, lockups are not mandatory in all of the countries, and even in
those for which they are, some do not vary in their duration. Lockup duration will there-
fore be a noisy signal of firm quality. The first two rows of Panel A of Table 1 1 reports
the mean market-adjusted initial IPO returns for companies with lockups of 1 80 days and
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for those whose lockups are longer, without controlling for whether the lockups are man-
datory or whether authorities in the countries vary their duration according to firm char-
acteristics. It can be see that mean abnormal returns for both shorter and longer lockups
are significantly positive, consistent with IPO underpricing, and that the underpricing is
greater for longer lockups. The third row confirms that the difference in mean abnormal
returns is significant.
The test is repeated in the next pair of rows in Panel B but this time with all com-
panies for which lockups are voluntary removed. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, removal
of voluntary lockups makes the duration signal less ambiguous and the difference in un-
derpricing between short and long lockup firms is increased. Panel C drops countries
whose lockups are mandatory but do not vary according to firm characteristics. Here,
contrary to duration as a signal becoming less ambiguous, the difference between short
and long lockup firms narrows rather than widens and the difference is insignificant.
However, the weakness of this last result may be due to the small number of highly vari-
able observations for the long lockups. I conclude that IPO underpricing is positively re-
lated to lockup duration and the specificity of firm characteristics. These results are con-
sistent with mandatory lockups signaling firm quality.
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Table 11. Initial IPO Returns and Lockup Duration
Lockup period Mean Sid. Dev. t-value N
All lockups, 180 days (1) 0.724 0.998 3.7002* 26
A All lockups, more than 180 days (2) 1.743 2.421 4.297* 35
Difference in means = (1) - (2) -1.019 - -2.262*
Mandatory lockups only, 180 days (3) 0.724 0.998 3.7002* 26
B Mandatory lockups only, more than 180 days (4) 1.946 2.484 4.36* 31
Difference in means = (3) - (4) -1.222 - -2.512*
Mandatory variable lockups only, 180 days (5) 0.724 0.998 3.7002* 26
C Mandatory variable lockups only, more than 180 days (6) 1.309 2.062 1.5548 6
Difference in means = (5) - (6) -0.585 - -0.6765
Descriptive statistics for market-adjusted abnormal returns in equation (3) on the first day of trading after
IPO issuance. Lockups are classified as to their duration, whether they are mandatory, and whether they are
mandatory and variable within a country. * denotes statistical significance at the 5 percent level (two-tailed
t tests). Tests for differences in means are unpaired.
5 .6 Family Firms and Market Activity Around Unlock Day
Table 12 summarizes market activity for family and non-family firms around the
unlock. At expiration day, family firms are not expected to sell out their shares. There-
fore, around the unlock date family firms should display lower trading volumes than non-
family firms but their returns and volatility of those returns is less clear. Unlike venture
capitalists who exist at the unlock date (Field and Hanka, 2001), family firms who are
initially reluctant to give up control of their firms are expected to exhibit less trading ac-
tivity. The graphical analysis shows that returns of family firms are more volatile than
non-family firms. The tests below report an insignificant reaction at the unlock date for
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both family and non-family firms, and the differences between the CARs and the abnor-
mal volume are insignificant as well.22
The abnormal volumes' insignificant test for family firms may suggest that in fact
these firms want to keep control. However, the other two tests including the difference
between the abnormal volume of both categories are insignificant. Therefore, hypothesis
4 cannot be confirmed and is rejected due to inconclusive results.
Table 12. Market Activity for Family and Non-family Firms
Mean Std.Dev. t-value N
A. CAR
Family Firms (1) -0.0119 0.0439 -1.2706 22
Non-family firms (2) 0.0001 0.0285 0.0313 39
Difference (I)- (2) -0.0164 - -0.7489
B. Abnormal Volume (V)
Family Firms (3) -0.2095 0.5938 -1.6551 22
Non-family firms (4) 0.1410 1.2033 0.7322 39
Difference (3) - (4) -0.3506 - -1.5208
Mean three-day cumulative abnormal returns from equation (2) and mean three-day abnormal volume from
equation (4), both straddling the unlock day. Tests of differences in means are unpaired.




The unlocking of a firm's shares is an event that may alarm shareholders and has
become of interest to researchers because of the way investors would react at known ex-
piration dates. One of the few studies on lockup expiration has shown a 40 percent in-
crease in trading volume and a 1.5 percent decrease in the three-day abnormal return in
the United States between 1988 and 1997 (Field & Hanka, 2001).
This study focused on a region that has received little attention perhaps because of
the paucity of data and real or perceived lack of transparency of its firms. Markets in the
MENA region are still very much developing. They are highly influenced by the practices
of the West and at the same time they diverge from them. With respect to IPOs, some of
the major differences are in longer lockups, the legal requirement to lockup (generally
mandatory in the MENA, voluntary in the United States) and the types of firms that play
an important role in the economy (family firms in the MENA versus venture-backed
firms in the United States).
The MENA region does not display the same market reaction as the United States
to the unlocking of shares. The lockup expiration in the MENA region passes "almost"
uneventfully, perhaps due to the mandatory nature of the lockup. Family firms do not
witness unusual differences in price or in trading volume.
MENA IPOs are underpriced just like the IPOs of its Western counterpart. The
signaling hypothesis adapted to the region under study presents interesting results. In-
deed, in the MENA, the IPO of a firm with a long lockup period is found to be more un-
derpriced than one with a shorter lockup period. Firms with long lockup periods are
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likely deemed as a riskier investment by authorities. Therefore, the offer price of the IPO
firms is underpriced as a compensation for the risk incurred in the investment. These
markets are still fragile. One of the roles of market authorities in the MENA region is to
protect investors by assessing the viability of firms undergoing an IPO, they also play the
part of the underwriter in imposing the lockup period. Even though the results show that
investors in the MENA region do not anticipate the expiration date, the length of the
lockup reflects the firm's quality in countries with mandatory and varied lockup laws.
Five years from now, the MENA region markets may be more transparent and
more efficient to enable them to attract more capital. Perhaps lockup laws might be trans-
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Stock Exchange Home Pages
Abu Dhabi SE: www.adsm.ae
Amman SE: www.ase.com.jo
Bahrain SE: www.bahrainstock.com
Doha SE: www.dsm.com.qa
Dubai FM: www.dfm.ae
Morocco SE: www.casablanca-bourse.com
Muscat SM: www.msm.gov.om
Saudi SE: www.tadawul.com.sa
Tunis SE: www.bvmt.com.tn
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